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World public debt has increased by 30% of world GDP between 2007 and
2017. During the same period, the real interest rate on public debt has fallen
by roughly 200 basis points, whereas it should have increased by 100 basis
points according to previous estimates. It reveals that demand for public debt
has increased faster than supply. Where does the increase in savings come
from? To answer this question, we construct the world financial market
equilibrium to identify the country and agents across countries who increased
their saving rate. Using the equality between the sum of private and public
saving and investment at the world level, we find four lessons. First, the world
investment rate has been slightly increasing during the period, with an
impressive shift of investment to China. The investment rate of China was 4%
of world GDP in 2007. It jumps to 12% in 2017. Second, during the period, the
world experienced an impressive reduction of global imbalances. The Chinese
saving rate increased less than Chinese investment and the US saving rate
increased more than US investment. Third, the increase in the world saving rate
comes from highly indebted countries before 2007, mostly from the US and
southern Europe. The increase in the current account of Italy, Spain and Greece
(from a negative territory) is the order of magnitude of the increase in the US
current account. Fourth, there is no clear relationship between the household
saving rate and national government borrowing, thus not confirming the
Ricardian equivalence view. Finally, it seems that the factors generating a high
net saving rate in China are temporary, whereas the deleveraging of US and
southern Europe may be long-lasting. As a consequence, one can expect low
interest rates for a long period of time. 
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The world financial markets have two new trends after the 2008
crisis. The first is the increase in public debt. The amount of public debt
over world GDP in advanced economies has increased from 71% in
2007 to 104%, 2017 (IMF, Fiscal Monitor). During this period, total
debt (both public and private) has increased by 30% to reach 225% of
world GDP in 2017. This is the highest level since 1950, at least.
The second trend is the falling real interest rate on public debt and
on all assets. For instance, the US real interest rate on 10-year govern-
ment bonds (inflation-indexed security) has fallen from 2.5% in 2007
to 0.5% in 2017. The average real lending rate computed by the IMF
has also fallen from 5.86% in 2007 to 4% in 2017%. The cause and
consequences of low interest rates are now debated around the world
(Blanchard, 2019).1
These two facts are puzzling. Before the crisis, the common wisdom
was that an increase in public debt generates an increase in real interest
rates to increase the remuneration of debt holders to induce them to
accept the additional public debt. This was confirmed by empirical esti-
mates, reaching the conclusion that an increase in 1% of public debt
over GDP among advanced countries would increase the interest rate
by 0.03% (Engen and Hubbard, 2005). Using such an estimate the
30% increase in public debt over GDP in advanced countries should
have increased the real interest rate by 1% between 2007 and 2017,
whereas it decreased by roughly 2%. Estimate of the Neutral Real rate
all concludes that the fall in the world saving rate is a first-order world
phenomenon Rachel and Summers (2019).
This raises the obvious question: Why has the demand for public
debt increased much more than the huge supply of public debt by
governments? Why are agents fighting to buy public debt around the
world? These questions are important to understand the period but
also to assess wether the current low real interest rates are a temporary
phenomenon, likely to be reversed, or if we can expect to be in a world
of low real interest rates for a long period of time. This has important
implications for the conduct of economic policy. The aim of this article
is to contribute to the resolution of this question by investigating the
1 The data are taken from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.RINR?locations=US and
ECB Economic Buletin, Issue 2/2019: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/
2019/html/ecb.ebbox201902_06 0c96ee6f7c.en.html indexbond return can be obtained from the
Fred database US: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFII10
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accounting equality to understand the change in the world financial
market equilibrium during the period.
The basic idea is obvious: At the world level, it has to be the case
that the sum of the world primary deficit is equal to the household
saving rate plus the firm net saving rate (net of investment). As a conse-
quence, the increase in the public deficit between 2007 and 2007 is
due either to an increase in saving rates or to a decrease in investment.
Although this is true at the world level, this may not be true in each
country, the change of the countries’ current account allowing coun-
tries to lend to each other.
We thus construct the world financial market equilibrium between
2007 and 2017 using various datasets to construct the public deficit in
each country, and investment and firm and household saving rates, to
understand who lent to the government during this period.
This investigation discriminates among various theories proposed in
the literature to explain the increase in saving rates and low interest
rates on public debt. For instance, Ricardian equivalence states that
households save more when public debt increases because they antici-
pate higher taxes. As a consequence, the household saving rate should
be correlated with the increase in public debt across countries: This can
be looked at in the data. Another explanation insists on Quantitative
Easing and the acquisition of public debt by central banks. This again
can be investigated by constructing the consolidated government
budget constraints. The first Section of the paper reviews the 6 expla-
nations often proposed (which are not mutually exclusive) ranging
from Ricardian equivalence, the Saving glut issue, to the Secular Stag-
nation hypothesis. We don’t pretend to confirm one single
explanation, but the empirical investigation clearly points toward some
directions. We now present the main finding of this investigation:  
1. Investment. The world investment rate slightly increases
during the period, invalidating a “crowding out” effect of
public investment, or a global Secular Stagnation associated
with low investment. Nevertheless, this hides an impressive
shift in the allocation of investment around the world. The
investment rate of Europe and the USA were 5% of world GDP
in 2017. This figure decreased to 4.5% in 2017. During the
same time, the Chinese investment rate increased from 6% to
12% of world GDP. Capital accumulation has clearly moved
to China. 
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rienced an impressive reduction of the divergence of current
account, notably the difference between China and the US,
which was called the “global imbalance” by Ben Bernanke. The
US current account improved during the period, reaching—
2.3% of US GDP. This rebalancing appears as an improvement
of the US current account. Second, the Chinese current
account decreased by more than 8% of Chinese GDP, whereas
the US current account increased by 2.8% of US GDP. This
rules out a “saving glut” type of explanation of the low interest
rate: It is not a single country that is lending to the rest-of-
the world. 
3. Private saving rate. The increase in the world saving rate
comes from countries that were highly indebted before 2007.
The increase in the current account of Italy, Spain and Greece
(from a negative territory) is roughly 80% of the increase in the
US current account. This comes either from an increase in the
private saving rate (Spain and Portugal), and mostly from a fall
in the investment rate. 
4. Household saving rate. There is no clear relationship between
the household saving rate and national government
borrowing, not confirming the Ricardian equivalence view. 
 From this analysis, our tentative conclusion is that we are either in a
low investment trap in Europe and in the US (local secular stagnation),
or in a period of deleveraging and rebalancing after a period of
abnormal and low saving rates. Considering the capital overaccumula-
tion in China, one can expect low real interest rates for a long period of
time.
2. Why has world net demand for public debt increased 
so much: A review of explanations
We review below standard explanations of the increase in the
demand for public debt between 2007 and 2017. Each of them has
generated an important literature, and they are not mutually exclusive.
First, to understand the relationship between the following explana-
tions, it is useful to recall a simple world accounting equality. This one
is formally derived in Section 3 below. At the world level and for each
year, it is always true that the sum of primary deficit across countries is
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investment. Formally, 
   Σ      State primary deficiti   =      Σ           Hous. savingi + (1)
     
all countries i                                                                all countries i 
                                                     +      Σ       (Firm saving – Investment)i (2)
                                                                                    
all countries i
The left-hand side increased a lot at the world level and the interest
rate declined. As a consequence, elements of the right hand side have
increased: Either the household’s saving or the firms’saving have
increased. Investment may have decreased. In addition this increase
may have taken place in some countries and not in others. The various
explanation concern each of the elements at the right-hand side. We
identify six explanation in the litterature. The first two ones relate to the
households saving rate. Explanations 3 and 4 concern the private
saving rate in some countries, like China. Explanation 5 is about the
monetization of public debt. Explanation 6 is about low investment.
We put in italics the implication of each explanation.  
1. Household saving rate: An increase in the household saving
rate could come from two channels. First, Ricardian equivalence,
as popularized by Barro (1974), states that savings increase as
public debt increases because households save to pay higer
expected taxes. Second, the increase in the household saving
rate could come from the increase in inequality, which changes
the distribution of income in favor of richer households with
higer saving rates. This explanation would imply that the house-
hold saving rate should increase with inequality If ones considers
that households consider the saving of the firms that they might
own, then it is the total private saving rate which should be
considered. One should thus observe an increase in private saving
rate related to the increase in public debt. 
2. Uncertainty and risk: looking for a safe haven, and precau-
tionary saving There is world demand for a safe asset (Gorton,
2016), and in particular for public debt, which are not contami-
nated by sovereign risk. The increase in the demand for public
debt could be the result of an increase in world risk aversion
between 2007 and 2017. This argument should imply an
increase in the world market price of risk. As explained above, the
real lending rate for a wide class of credit types has decreased by
almost 2%. In addition the risk premium doesn’t exhibit a clear
upward trend over the recent period (Jorda, Knoll, Kuvshinov,
Schularick, and Taylor, 2019 and also the discussion in Rachel
and Summers, 2019). As a consequence, a low real interest rate,
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but an increase in world desired net saving. As a consequence,
we will leave aside this explanation which is not in the data. 
3. Saving glut and Twin Deficit Theory: To explain the persistent
US Current Account deficit, Ben Bernanke has explained the role
of the high-saving countries like China in growing world saving.
It may be possible that the high demand for public debt comes
from specific high-saving countries. In the same vein, countries
could finance their public debt by borrowing from the rest of the
world. This would imply a decreasing current account in countries
where public debt is growing. 
4. Private Deleveraging. The reduction of the borrowing of the
private sector in some countries generates an increase in the net
household saving rate (which is saving minus borrowing). The
increase in world public debt coud only partly compensate a
decrease in private borrowing (Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, 2017;
Fornaro, 2018; Challe and Ragot, 2011). We should then observe
an increase in the household saving rate in countries with a highly
indebted private sector.  
5. Monetization an central bank quantitative easing. Monetary
policy during the crisis by standard and non-standard monetary
policy generated a sharp increase in the demand for public debt
by central banks (public debt monetization). This could generate
a decrease in the interest rate on public debt, see Vissing-
Jorgensen and Krishnamurthy (2011) or Beck, Duca, and Stracca
(2019). As the real interest rates have globally decreased over
the period (See Point 2 above), the effect of public debt moneti-
zation should be a global increase in the net saving rate. There is
a little bit of confusion in the literature about the net effect of
public debt monetization and national saving rates. We delay
the implications of this explanation to the next Section, where
we lay down accounting equalities to understand the effects. 
6. Low investment and secular stagnation. The weak recovery
after the 2008 crisis has stimulated a debate about a possible
secular stagnation and low investment due to weak demand
(Summers, 2016; or Le Garrec and Touzé, 2016). The net saving
rate might have increased due to low investment. The increase
in public debt would be the decrease in the demand for funds
by firms. The dynamics of investment in each country can be
observed in the data. We should observe a fall in the world
investment rate. 
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relative increase in the demand for public debt, althouth the reader
might have other explanations in mind. It should be clear that these
explanations are not mutually exclusive. We now provide statistics
about the world financial market to observe trends of the relevant vari-
ables. Anticipating, the data seem to favor private deleveraging and
possibly low investment as important explanations.
3. Who financed the world’s borrowing? 
3.1. The increase in public debt (normalized by GDP)
First, the increase in public debt between 2007 and 2017 is impres-
sive. The average increase in public debt is more than 20% among
OECD countries. Figure 1 reports the increase for a selection of coun-
tries (with standard identifier), as a percentage of world GDP.
Importantly, we normalize this increase by world GDP (and not the
domestic GDP),to represent the evolution of the relative size of each
country’s public debt at the world level. Denote as Bi,t the outstanding
public debt of country i at the end of year t  in current dollars. We thus
represent  for each country i. To simplify the exposition,
we focus on some countries (not representing India, or oil exporting
countries for instance).
Figure 1 shows that the increase in world debt is driven mostly by
the US, and by China and Japan to a smaller extent. The case of Italy is
interesting. Italian public debt over Italian GDP increased from 104%
to 134% from 2007 to 2017. But Italian GDP has actually fallen during
the period, and world GDP has actually increased. As a consequence,
Italian GDP has decreased from 3.8% of world GDP to 2.4%, and
Italian public debt has actually decreased as a fraction of world GDP.
This Figure confirms the obvious fact of a generalized increase in
public borrowing, and raised the motivating question: Who lent to
governments around the world? To answer this question, we first
perform a simple accounting decomposition. The evolution of public
debt is the sum of the primary deficit denoted as Di,t = Gi,t – Ti,t and
the net interest payment minus other possible sources of additional
public income.
 
Xavier Ragot and Ricardo Pinois172The oustanding debt of a country i can be held by the private
sector, by central banks or by foreigners. The total interest payment on
the public debt in year t – 1 is denoted ri,t–1 Bi,t–1. The interest rate ri,t–1
is thus the annualized average interest rate across the various maturities
of public debt. Additional public income includes the profits of central
banks rebated to the governments, which are mainly the interest
payment paid to the central banks holding public debt: ri,t–1 B
CB
t–1 . It
also includes other sources of income denoted Ei,t during year t. Ei,t
includes the profits of publicly owned firms and the returns from privat-
ization, among others. The basic accounting equality is thus:
(3)
 Then, from the definition of GDP,  Yi,t = Ci,t + Gi,t,t + Ii,t + Xi,t – Mi,t ,
one obtains the traditional equality between the current account and
the excess of national savings over investment: CAi,t = S
nat
i,t – Ii,t , where
CAi,t  is the current account of country i at the end of year t and Ii,t  is
the private investment of country i during year t. Separating the invest-
ment rate by three institutional sectors (the Government, Households
and Firms), and noting that Di,t   is the opposite of public saving), one
finds Snati,t = –Di,t  + SHi,t + SFi,t . One thus obtains: 
Di,t  = SHi,t + SFi,t – Ii,t – CAi,t (4)
Figure 1. Change in public debt, 2007-2017, normalized by world GDP
                     In percentage points
Source: Author’s calculations. See Appendix A for data source.
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in country i is financed either by the saving rate of households SHi,t , by
the net saving of firms (SFi,t – Ii,t ) and thus possibly a low investment, or
by the rest of the world, i.e. a negative current account, showing that
government i is borrowing from the rest-of-the world. 2
The previous equality is an accounting equality and is “true”
(notwithstanding some measurement issues). In addition, at the world
level the sum of all current accounts should be 0 (no one is lending
money to Earth). As a consequence, if we sum all countries, we have,
for any year: 
 Σ       Di,t   =     Σ          SHi,t +      Σ      (SFi,t – Ii,t ) (5)
                              
all countries i                  all countries i                  all countries i 
We can first use equations of equality (4) and (5) to provide insights
about the financing of the world deficit.
3.2. Central banks and public debt: Monetization?
First, decomposition (4) can be used to discuss the monetization of
public debt. The acquisition of public debt by central banks doesn’t
appear in the expression (4), nor on the world financial market (5).
Indeed, buying public debt and increasing the balance sheet of the
central banks has no direct effect on the national saving rate. It substi-
tutes public debt in the portfolio of some agents by money, for exactly
the same value (as public debt is bought by central banks on the
market at the market price). What is the gain for the government? The
only gain is that the government substitutes an outstanding debt
bearing a nominal interest rate ri,t against money, which is a central
bank liability with a zero interest rate (by definition). The obvious
conclusion is that monetization doesn’t in itself increase or decrease
the national saving rate. Additional theories must be introduced to
explain why agents holding money instead of public debt (for the net
present value) would save more or less.
The gain of monetization is that it reduces the interest payment on
public debt, thus reducing the volume of public debt, every thing else
being constant, as seen from (3). This effect obeviously depends on the
nominal interest rate ri,t–1 , and it is exactly 0, when the nominal
interest rate is 0.
2 We actually denote as investment the total private investment (from households and firms),
because we don’t have the data to separate the two. This will only affect the interpretation of the
results.
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thus be analysed by its effect on the risk structure and inflation. Indeed,
the increase in the quantity of money may raise inflation expectations,
to a high level. This potential risk is likely to materialize in the coming
years as inflation is small or below target in many countries. Moreover,
the link between central bank money in inflation is weak in a world of
high precautionary savings. Finally, if inflation risk is small, domestic
money might be seen as a safer asset than public debt in highly
indebted countries. In this case, monetization would decrease
perceived financial fragility. The link between central bank money,
private credit, inflation and financial fragility is unfortunately outside
the scope of the current paper. We here only recall that public debt
monetization should first be seen as a swap between two assets leaving
the wealth of households unchanged, before considering the effect on
the macroeconomic risk structure. 
3.3. The big shift in investment
During the period, world investment stayed roughly constant. As a
consequence, one cannot argue that the increase in world public debt
has generated a global crowding-out of private investment by public
debt. However and importantly, as shown by Figure 2, the world expe-
riences a major shift of capital accumulation from Europe (EU15) and
the USA to China. Investment increased rapidly in China after 2007,
whereas it decreased in Europe and the US. This impressive shift reflects
an obvious structural change at the world level. The investment rate in
China (as a share of world total investment) has risen from 6% in 2007
to 28% in 2017, whereas the investment rate in the US and Europe
(Euro area 15 countries), has sharply decreased over the same period.
This trend in Chinese investment at the world level is the result of both
an increase in the Chinese investment rate (relative to Chinese GDP,
from 41.5% to 44.3%), and an increase in Chinese GDP relative to
world GDP (from 16% to 28% from 2007 to 2017).
As noted by Holz (2019), the investment level in China is mostly a
political outcome. The Chinese government directly affects investment
to finance infrastructure projects, by channeling credit to government-
supported investment projects. It also uses regulation to increase
investment, for example in the residential real estate sector, or using
sectoral investment guidelines. Although, globally the China’s capital
output ratio is not very different from that in other countries, one can
suspect an important overaccumulation of capital in China. Indeed, the
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many sectors. For instance, in the coal industry capacity utilization fell
for 76% to 64% (Ju and Wang, 2017). For the steel industry, China
represents roughly half of world production, and overcapacity (meas-
ured as the difference between capacity and normal production) has
steadily increased from 16% in 2007 to 27% in 2015 (Brun, 2016). It is
thus unlikely that investment in China will stay at such a high rate,
without raising the issue of non-performing loans in the banking sector
and other financial distortions. In other words, the increase in invest-
ment is China is the outcome of public policies, whereas the decrease
in investment in the other areas is a market-based phenomenon.
Next, we represent the change in the investment rate at the world
level between 2007 and 2017. More preciselyn we represent, for each
country i, the change  . Investment has fallen in
all countries, except China, as can be seen in Figure 3.
The fall in investment is a world major issue. There can be two main
explanations, with opposite policy conclusions. First, the fall in world
investment is a correction of previous imbalances accumulated
because of the debt and housing bubble: Households and firms
believed that they were richer than they really were. As a consequence,
they consumed and invested too much. The burst of the bubble in
2008 is a world correction equivalent to a world negative wealth shock
Figure 2. Investment as a share of world total investment
 In %
Source: Author’s calculations. See Appendix A for data source.
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tion, the fall in investment is a healthy adjustment.
The second explanation considers that the explosion of the bubble
in 2008 generated a brutal fall in demand, which could not be
corrected by monetary policy, due to a zero lower bound on the
nominal interest rate. In addition, the fiscal space being limited at the
world level, the world economy moved into another low-activity equi-
librium with low inflation and low economic activity. This would be the
secular stagnation trap (Summers, 2016; Le Garrec and Touzé, 2016
for a formal treatment). The discussion of the two main explanations is
outside the scope of this paper. We here only insist on the world fall in
investment, except in China, where the increase in investment is likely
to be a policy outcome, and not a market phenomenon.
3.4. Current account: The end of global imbalances?
Next, we present the change in current accounts between 2007
and 2017, as a percent of world GDP. This is thus  
for each country i. As the sum of the world current account is 0, the
sum of countries is also 0, Σcountries i ΔCAi = 0.
Figure 3. Change in Investment, 2007-2017, normalized by world GDP
     In percentage points
Source: Author’s calculations. See Appendix A for data source.
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Public debt and the world financial market 177The Figure 4 shows clearly the world rebalancing. The US current
account was very negative in 2007, equal to -5.1% of US GDP. The US
current account improved during the period, reaching -2.3% of US
GDP. This rebalancing appears as an improvement of the US current
account. Second, the Chinese current account was very positive in
2007, equal to +10.1% of GDP. It decreases to +1.3% of GDP in 2017.
The sharp reduction appears as a negative change in the Chinese
current account over the period. To a smaller extent, this is also the
case for Japan. As a consequence, this graph should be read as a a
reduction of global imbalances, except possibly for Germany.
There are two implications from Figure 4. First, as the public debt of
both US and China increased during the crisis, this graph doesn’t
support a saving glut explanation for the demand for world public
debt: a country isn’t financing the rest of the world by a high current
account surplus. Second, the increase in the current accounts of Italy,
Spain and Greece (from a negative territory) is roughly 80% the
increase in the US current account. As a consequence, the world rebal-
ancing of international saving should be seen as the global
deleveraging (both public and private) of the US and the south of
Europe. Globally, this increase in saving was compensated by the
decrease in the (net) saving of China, Japan and Canada.
Figure 4. Change in current account, 2007-2017, normalized by world GDP
    In percentage points
Source: Author’s calculations. See Appendix A for data source.
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imbalance in current account has been reduced between the US and
China, there are still long-lasting imbalances within the Euro area.
Indeed, Germany and the Netherlands still have a very high current
account surplus. Germany's current account surplus is among the
highest in the world in dollar value. As a consequence, there must be
some countries borrowing to absorb these excess savings. This may
reduce or even stop the deleveraging process in the south of Europe.
The cause of these European imbalances is investigated in Le Moigne
and Ragot (2015), who insist on nominal imbalances (and thus internal
exchange rate misalignments) within the Euro area.
Summary data. To summarize the change between 2007 and
2017, Table 1 reports changes in key-variables for various countries for
the same period.
The first column is the annualized change in public debt over GDP
in percent (roughly the cumulated change between 2017 and 2007
divided by 10, or the annual total public deficit)3. Undoubtedly the
increase in public debt is unprecedented in peace-time. The increase
was 40% of GDP in the US and 30% in France and Italy, but stayed
roughly constant in Germany. The second column is the change in the
private saving rate, denoted as SP. There is no clear pattern concerning
the households saving rate. The correlation is actually slightly negative.
As a consequence, one cannot easily conclude that Ricardian equiva-
lence is valid and that the increase in public debt has been financed by
an increase in domestic private saving, for all countries. Columns three
and four decompose the private saving in household saving and firm
saving. Column 5 is the change in the investment rate between 2017
and 2007. Finally, column six is the change in the current account.
Again, one doesn’t observe a significant relationship between a change
in the public debt and a change in the current account. As explained
before, both China and the US have experienced a sharp increase in
public debt, but an increase in the current account in the US and a
decrease in China.
Although no clear pattern appears across countries concerning
household saving and the current account, there is a common trend
concerning investment. This is clearly shown by the behavior of the
average country. The last two lines of Table 1 indeed provides a
country mean, with and without China, which appears as an exception
3 This normalization is provided to compare flows.
Public debt and the world financial market 179regarding its increase in investment. First, one can observe that the
average country financed its yearly increase of 3.15% in public debt by
a small increase in private saving (0.67), and an important decrease in
investment (-3.39). This allows a reduction of the current account
deficit (3.00). This average is not weighted by a country’s GDP so as
not to give too high a weight to the US. The USA experiences a similar
pattern with a higher increase in household private savings.
This analysis provides an important conclusion. The increase in
public debt at the world was financed mainly by the deleveraging of
the US and the south of Europe and by a fall in investment. This has
been compensated at the world level by an increase in investment in
China, higher than the increase in private saving, which absorbed
Table 1. Change in saving and investment bahavior between 2007 and 2017
SP is private saving (percentage points)
Country ΔB ΔSP ΔSH ΔSF ΔI ΔCA
AUS 3.11 2.15 0.98 1.17 -4.13 4.83
AUT 1.38 -1.47 -5.58 4.11 0.55 -1.88
BEL 1.64 -1.43 -5.4 3.97 0.123 -.77
CAN 2.29 -1.88 -0.38 -1.49 -.362 -3.57
CHN 1.79 1.77 — — 3.4 -8.59
DEU 0.19 -0.6 -0.37 -0.23 -0.66 1.22
DNK 0.79 4.45 9.05 -4.6 -3.67 6.45
ESP 6.29 3.71 0.14 3.57 -10.23 11.58
FIN 2.73 -1.9 -1.38 -0.52 -2.7 -4.37
FRA 3.27 -1.14 -0.96 -.18 -0.71 -.19
GBR 4.58 -0.52 -4.43 3.9 -1.15 -.13
GRC 7.87 -10.94 -15.68 4.75 -14.62 12.36
IRL 4.46 19.01 7.57 11.44 -4.41 13.91
ITA 3.2 -0.33 -5.79 5.46 -4.53 4.22
JPN 6.22 -0.4 0.05 -0.45 -0.58 -.67
NLD 1.45 -0.56 7.24 -7.79 -2.68 4.55
NOR -1.27 3.27 5.79 -2.51 0.85 -6.80
PRT 5.72 2.17 -3.32 5.49 -6.19 10.33
SVN 5.08 -1.58 -2.94 1.36 -11.53 11.33
SWE 0.27 -0.25 5.61 -5.85 0.92 -5.01
USA 4.04 1.55 3.02 -1.47 -2.01 2.61
Mean 3.10 0.72 — — -3.06 2.44
Mean (without CHN) 3.15 0.67 -0.34 1.01 -3.39 3.00
Source: Author’s calculations. See Appendix A for data source.
Xavier Ragot and Ricardo Pinois180partly the excess world saving. In other words, if investment had not
grown so fast in China, the demand for funds would have been
reduced and the real interest rate would have been even smaller.
The previous analysis considered changes in flows between the end
of the period and the beginning of the period. We now investigate
the world financial market considering the cumulative change during
the period.
4. The financing of the cumulative deficit
The goal of this Section is not to understand the difference in public
debt between 2017 and 2017 (and not annualized flow). This change
has to be equal to the change in private saving minus investment,
taking into account interest payment. Hence, to consider the cumula-
tive change over the period, we sum the yearly balance (3) for the years
between 2008 and 2017. The change in public debt between 2007
and 2017 is now the cumulative change in public borrowing, consid-
ering the contribution of interest payments:
The previous decomposition is a little bit misleading, as GDP is
changing over the period. For this reason, we will actually report the
following decomposition, normalized by the cumulated GDP over the
period, focusing on the primary deficit:
(6)
The interest of this decomposition is that each term can be easily
understood. The left-hand side is the cumulative change in the primary
deficit over the total increase of GDP over the period. It can be roughly
interpreted as the average yearly primary deficit as a percentage of
GDP. The first term on the right-hand side is   
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Public debt and the world financial market 181which is the annual net saving of firms in country i over the period
2008-2017. The second term is the annualized household saving rate,
and the last term is the opposite of the annualized current account.
We define the following quantities for each country (lowercase
letters are used for ratios)
Such that for each country i : 
(7)
This decomposition is the cumulative counterpart of the one in the
previous Section. For each country the increase in the primary deficit is
financed either by an increase in investment net of investment or by
the rest of the world through a deterioration of the current account.
For some countries (China), we don’t have the decomposition
between the household and the firm saving rate, but only the private
saving rate. In this case, we define  
And the decomposition is now 
  
We plot some figures as a summary of the data.
4.1. Change in primary state borrowing and net private saving
We first turn to the relationship between the increase in government
borrowing and private saving. As explained above, Ricardian equiva-
lence implies that private agents (both households and firms),
anticipating an increase in taxes to finance interest payments on the
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Xavier Ragot and Ricardo Pinois182public debt, raise their savings by the same amount. In this case, the
increase in saving would have been equal to the increase in public debt.
To represent this graphically, we report the net of the interest increase
in public debt and the increase in private saving, using the accounting
equality of decomposition (6). We report the change in public debt
 on the x-axis and the private saving rate 
on the y-axis for each country. We also plot the 45% degree line, where
both values are equal (perfect Ricardian equivalence).
One can observe that countries are on both sides of the 45% line.
There are thus no clear patterns supporting Ricardian equivalence.
Countries below the 45% line have financed their increase in public
debt either by a reduction in the current account. Countries above the
45% line have seen an increase in net private saving above the increase
in public debt. At the world level, one should thus consider that coun-
tries above the 45% line generated excess saving (relative to
government borrowing) to finance the deficit of saving of countries
below the 45% line.
Figure 5. Normalized average saving rate of the private sector against normalized 
primary deficit
Source: Author’s calculations. See Appendix A for data source.
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Public debt and the world financial market 1834.2. Twin-deficit theory
To further investigate the relationship between the increase in
public debt and international borrowing, we examine the so-called
twin deficit “theory.”4 We report ca on the y-axis, as the
cumulative domestic borrowing from the rest of the world, and
 bp on the x-axis. We also plot the 45% line, where the correla-
tion between the two values is exactly one.
   One can observe that most countries are below the 45% degree
line, implying that the increase in public borrowing is mostly financed
by domestic savings, what confirms the average finding of Table 1
discussed above. This is also consistent with the previous analysis
showing that the increase in public debt occurred during a period of
world rebalancing in external positions.
4 The twin-deficit “theory” could be seen as the exact “opposite” to Ricardian equivalence. It
assumes that the behavior of private agents doesn’t change after an increase in public debt. As a
consequence, the increase in public debt is financed one-for-one by a deficit in the current account:
the government deficit and the external deficit move together.
Figure 6. Normalized average borrowing from the rest of the world against the 
normalized primary deficit
Source: Author’s calculations. See Appendix A for data source.
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Xavier Ragot and Ricardo Pinois184Second, the pictures exhibit globally an increasing pattern. Coun-
tries lending more to the rest of the world (negative ROTW borrowing)
are countries with the smaller cumulative deficit. The direction of the
causality is an open question. Surplus countries (below the x-axis)
having a State borrowing (to the right of the y-axis) have experienced a
net increase in private saving over domestic investment. The previous
Section has shown that this was the result mainly of a fall in investment
during the period.
4.3. The financing of the cumulative deficit
We now provide the full decomposition (6) for all relevant coun-
tries. As was discussed above, each number should be interpreted as
the average rates over the period. For instance, Australia increased its
public debt by 3.08% of GDP during the period 2007-2017, whereas
the average saving rate of households is 7.06% over the period.
Considering the change in the current account, the last column reports
the average value of the current account. A positive number thus
implies that the country relatively lent to the rest of the world, whereas
a negative number states that the country borrowed from the rest of
the world. For instance, although the current account of China
decreased over the period as discussed in Table 1, it stayed positive and
equal to the average value of 2.67% of GDP over the period. Hence,
China financed the rest of the world, but less and less.
 The first column is the normalized primary deficit. Obviously, the
total public deficit is the primary deficit plus the interest payment on
public debt. For this reason, the sign of the value for Italy is negative, as
most of the budget deficit is t the interest payment on public debt. The
Table clearly shows the huge increase in investment in China (46%)
compared to other countries. The Chinese investment annualized
investment rate is more than twice the average rate of other countries.
Most countries have a private saving that is higher than investment.
This is not the case for Italy, Portugal and Greece notably. It is likely
that these countries with a high public debt and negative current
account will experience an increase in saving to rebalance their
external position.
The average country experienced an annualized net of saving over
investment of 2.8% (equal to 25.49% minus 22.7%), which wasused
to finance the increase of public debt (deficit) of 1.66% and an annual-
ized current account of 1.10%.
Public debt and the world financial market 1855. Conclusion
As a global summary, the previous analysis shows that public debt
was absorbed by an increase in the world saving rate above invest-
ment. First, for most countries (except China), the fall in private
investment explains a big part of the increase in net saving. Second,
the smaller increase in private saving is mostly the outcome of the
deleveraging in the US and the south of Europe. Third, world invest-
ment stayed constant mainly due to a sharp increase in investment in
China. Fourth, deleveraging in the US and rising investment in China
has contributed to a reduction in global imbalances. The descriptive
Table 2. Cumulated financing of debt (%, domestic GDP)
Country  Σ 2017
 2007  Σ
 2017
 2007 Σ
 2017
 2007 Σ
 2017
 2007 Σ
 2017
 2007 Σ
 2017
 2007
AUS 2.79 25.7 6.78 18.91 26.84 -3.94
AUT 0.29 26.66 8.92 17.75 23.88 2.48
BEL -0.23 23.39 6.69 16.7 23.82 -0.19
CAN 0.93 22.38 3.65 18.71 23.97  -2.52
CHN 1.69 50.43  —  — 45.78 2.96
DEU -1.25 25.98 9.75 16.23 20.28 6.95
DNK -0.46 26.56 0.95 25.61 20.83 6.19
ESP 4.47 23.67 2.74 20.93 21.57 -2.37
FIN 0.9 24.16 0.53 23.63 23.33  -0.066
FRA 2.18 24.19 9.3 14.89 22.85  -0.83
GBR 3.84 16.76 3.68 13.08 16.99  -4.07
GRC 2.64 11.93 -9.09 21.01 16.64 -7.35
IRL 5.27 32.92 5.01 27.91 24.93 2.72
ITA -1.13 17.62 4.57 13.05 19.17 -0.41
JPN 6.23 31.95 2.42 29.54 23.07 -0.41
NLD 1.02 29.37 7.25 22.12 20.54 7.81
NOR -8.55 29.01 6.12 22.89 26.78 10.78
PRT 2.34 16.24 -1.17 17.4 18.54 -4.65
SVN 2.56 27.02 5.91 21.11 22.84 1.63
SWE -0.47 29.11 13.61 15.5 24.15 5.44
USA 3.58 21.06 6.84 14.22 20.28 -2.8
Mean 1.36 25.53 4.72 19.56 23.19 0.97
Source: Author’s calculations. See Appendix A for data source.
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Xavier Ragot and Ricardo Pinois186statistics presented in this paper did not confirm any simple explana-
tion such as the twin-deficit theory or an implication of Ricardian
equivalence. The low interest rate is mostly the outcome of low private
investment in a a period of reduction of global imbalances and of
deleveraging. Obviously, the perspective of this paper was descriptive,
and additional econometric estimations would be necessary to qualify
this conclusion, with the usual caveats.
From these trends we can infer some prospective implications for
the evolution of the real interest rate. The deleveraging after the crisis is
likely to be a permanent phenomenon, correcting the financial imbal-
ances accumulated before the 2008 recession. The various investment
plans in China are likely to have generated an over-accumulation of
capital in China and may not be a permanent phenomenon. For this
reason, it is most likely that the world investment rate will decrease,
contributing to a further decrease in the world real interest rate.
This analysis did not put forward monetary policy and Quantitative
easing as a main driver of the increase in the world saving rate above
investment. Indeed, the increase in the world net saving rate and the
decrease in investment doesn’t square well with a key role for mone-
tary policy, which should have had the opposite effect5. This doesn’t
mean that expansionary monetary policy did not contribute to limiting
the fall in aggregate demand, but it shows that there are deep trends
pushing toward a contraction in aggregate demand in a world of high
public debts.
Finally, the analysis points toward the key issue of the decrease in
world investment. This is currently hidden by the sharp increase in
China, which is mostly the outcome of public policies. The “secular
stagnation” hypothesis claims that a world deficit in aggregate
demand is inefficient, which would necessitate additional expansionary
fiscal policy. Another hypothesis is that this fall in investment is the
market adjustment to the negative wealth shock resulting from is the
burst of the world housing bubble. This contribution cannot pretend to
answer this question but only to put it very high on the agenda.
 
5 There is a current debate about the possibility that expansionary monetary policy could have
generated some fall (and not an increase) in aggregate demand, due to an income effect. We leave
this effect for future research, but this “reverse” effect is highly controversial, see BlHu:19.
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A. Data source
The data used comes from various sources which are described
below.
The saving rates come from the World Development Indicator data
set, provided by the World Bank, and is described as GDP less final
consumption expenditure (total consumption).
The investment rates come from the World Economic Outlook 2019
data set, provided by the International Monetary Fund, and is
described in current local currency and GDP in current local currency.
Investment or gross capital formation is measured by the total value of
the gross fixed capital formation and changes in inventories and acqui-
sitions less disposals of valuables for a unit or sector
The Household saving rate is provided by the OECD and is
described as the subtraction of household consumption expenditure
from household disposable income, plus the change in net equity of
households in pension funds. Household saving is the main domestic
source of funds to finance capital investment, a major impetus for long-
term economic growth. This indicator is measured as a percentage of
household disposable income.
Household consumption comes from the World Development Indi-
cator data set, provided by the World Bank, and is defined as
Households and NPISHs final consumption expenditure (% of GDP).
Government final consumption comes from the World
Development Indicator data set, provided by the World Bank and is
defined as all government current expenditures for purchases of goods
and services (including compensation of employees). It also includes
most expenditures on national defense and security, but excludes
government military expenditures that are part of government capital
formation.
Tax revenues come from the World Development Indicator data set,
provided by the World Bank, and refers to compulsory transfers to the
central government for public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers
such as fines, penalties, and most social security contributions are
excluded. Refunds and corrections of erroneously collected tax revenue
are treated as negative revenue.
Public debt and the world financial market 189Public debt data comes from the IMF Global Debt Database and is
defined as General Government debt as a % of GDP.
Nominal GDP comes from the World Development Indicator data
set, provided by the World Bank, and is defined as GDP at purchaser’s
prices and is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in
the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not
included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making
deductions for the depreciation of fabricated assets or for the depletion
and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars.
Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using
single year official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official
exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual
foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used.
The current accounts come from various sources: International
Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files,
and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates.
As a summary of the quality of the data, the next figure reports the
aggregate saving and investment rate at the world level in dollars for
the period.
Figure Appendix. World saving and investment, in dollars
Source: Author’s calculations.
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